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THE MYTH OF FACTUAL INNOCENCE
MORRIS B. HOFFMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Almost all criminal defendants plead guilty, and almost all of them do
so because they are guilty. The ones who take their cases to trial are also
overwhelmingly guilty, at least in the sense that there is no issue about
whether they committed the charged acts. The relatively few felony cases
that actually go to trial in America are typically about moral guilt, not fac-
tual guilt. That is, they are about the level of the defendant's culpability and
therefore the level of the crime of which he will be convicted. I
Yet the picture of the American criminal justice system painted in 12
Angry Men is of a truth-finding system so feeble that it must depend, in the
end, on the instincts of a single courageous dissenting juror-in this case
Juror #8, played by Henry Fonda. 2 True, it wouldn't have been much of a
movie if the young unnamed Puerto Rican defendant had actually been
guilty of killing his father and pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, or if Henry
Fonda and his colleagues spent all that time 3 arguing about what real juries
argue about-the meaning of phrases like "with intent and after delibera-
tion," "knowingly," "recklessly" or "beyond a reasonable doubt"4-in de-
* District Judge, Second Judicial District (Denver), State of Colorado. The views expressed here
do not necessarily reflect the views of the Second Judicial District or any of my colleagues on that
Court.
1. These categorical pronouncements about the rates of factual innocence are based not just on
my own sixteen years of experience on the bench but also on the best data we have about these ques-
tions, discussed in Part I. The panic, both in the academy and in the popular press, about the sweeping
tide of wrongful convictions is, alas, part of the myth of factual innocence discussed in this essay.
2. 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957). One of the admirable things about the movie
is that viewers-at least this viewer-are left with mixed feelings about the defendant's factual guilt or
innocence. The $64,000 question, of course, is whether those "mixed feelings" rise to the level of
reasonable doubt, and the movie does a poor job of exploring that question. See infra note 4.
3. One of the unrealistic things about the movie is that the jury deliberations, which consume all
but a few minutes of the film at the beginning and end, are presented in continuous real time, yet they
take only 90 minutes. There is no effort to employ time compression or other artistic devices to convey
the sense that this wrenching process-in which Henry Fonda single-handedly sways all eleven of his
fellow jurors-takes more than about an hour and a half.
4. There was a brief discussion of reasonable doubt in the middle of the deliberations, and the
phrase was mentioned a few times after that as more and more jurors joined Fonda's position. But,
interestingly, the entirety of the brief discussion about reasonable doubt consisted of the immigrant
watchmaker (Juror #11, played by George Voskovec) asking the impatient baseball fan (Juror #7,
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ciding whether the defendant was guilty of first degree murder, second
degree murder, or criminally negligent homicide.
Innocence projects are in some ways the modem post-conviction
equivalent of 12 Angry Men. Because there are just too few Henry Fondas
in modem jury pools-or so the innocence project orthodoxy goes-vast
seas of wrongfully-convicted defendants must today rely on law students
and their clinical faculty advisors to do what Fonda-less juries have chroni-
cally failed, and continue to fail, to do.
5
I don't mean to suggest that innocence projects are a bad thing, or that
courageous individual jurors whose efforts result in the acquittal of inno-
cent defendants (or, for that matter, courageous individual jurors whose
efforts result in the conviction of guilty defendants) are some kind of naive
joke we sophisticated insiders should cluck at. On the contrary, I have
gained a deep respect for jurors since coming to the bench and seeing so
many trials. There is something almost mystical in their collective ability to
find the truth about a case, both factual and moral. 6 It is my respect for
jurors and the jury system that puts me at odds with the Chicken Littles of
Innocence who think wrongful conviction is, if not the rule, then at least a
very common exception.
True, innocence projects have been instrumental in suggesting points
in the system that are particularly vulnerable to truth-detection errors, espe-
cially cross-racial eyewitness identifications 7 and interrogation-induced
false confessions.8 Quite apart from the rates of these errors, it is critical for
anyone who cares about maximizing the reliability of the system to identify
common sources of error in an effort to reduce them. Unfortunately, the
played by Jack Warden) whether he knows what reasonable doubt means, and the impatient baseball
fan getting angry that an immigrant would ask such an apparently obvious question. But several times
during the deliberations Henry Fonda asks, "Yes, but it is possible?" with reference to his interpretation
of a particular piece of evidence, suggesting that the movie's writer, director, and legal consultants did
not understand the difference between reasonable inferences and speculation, or between reasonable
doubt and speculative doubt.
5. For those of you who think this description of the assumptions behind some innocence pro-
jects is exaggerated, I refer you to these comments by Rob Warden, the Executive Director of the
Center for Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of Law: "You hear the lofty
pronouncement that better 10 guilty men go free than one innocent man suffer.... But as a nation,
we've never believed that. It's the other way around." Chip Rowe, False Justice: Are 100,000+ Inno-
cent Men in U.S. Prisons?, PLAYBOY, July 2002, available at http://www.chiprowe.com/ articles/false-
justice.html. That is, Mr. Warden believes that we "as a nation" think it is better to send ten innocent
people to prison than let one guilty person go free, a goal that, if achieved by the criminal justice sys-
tem, would result in a wrongful conviction rate of approximately 91%.
6. See infra Part II for a discussion of the difference between factual and moral guilt.
7. See John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28
AM. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2001).
8. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004) (documenting and analyzing more than 125 false confessions).
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political subtext of the average innocence project is not that infrequent
wrongful convictions must be detected and remedied, but rather that the
system as a whole is profoundly unreliable and that the factual innocence
revealed by the projects is just the tip of an iceberg of injustice.9
But the phenomenon of 12 Angry Men and the explosion of innocence
projects are not just about melodramatic license or extreme political peda-
gogy. Their resonance with lawyers, legal scholars, law students, and even
ordinary citizens summoned for jury duty transcend their caricatures of the
system. Myths, after all, are myths precisely because their oversimplifica-
tions, and even misrepresentations, try to teach us something important
about the world and our place in it. In the best myths, what we lose in em-
pirical truth we gain in a kind of transcendent insight.
Does 12 Angry Men really deserve the label "transcendent"? Probably
not. It was not the first, or last, movie about wrongful (or almost wrongful)
convictions. There has been a continuous stream of them since at least
1943.10 12 Angry Men does not seem to have had nearly the broad cultural
impact lawyers assume. It was a financial disaster, despite its low budget.'l
It was (horror of horrors!) originally a teleplay, and although it was nomi-
nated for three academy awards (none for Henry Fonda), it didn't win any,
losing out in all three nominated categories (Best Picture, Best Director
(Sidney Lumet) and Best Adapted Screenplay) to Bridge on the River
Kwai. 12 I'm afraid its popularity among the lawyering classes is akin to the
popularity of kung fu movies among teenage boys.13
9. See supra note 5. In a claim typical of innocence projects, Northwestem's Center on Wrongful
Convictions says in its mission statement that one of its purposes is to raise public awareness of the
"prevalence" of wrongful convictions. Center on Wrongful Convictions, Northwestern University
School of Law, http://www.law.northwestem.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful/mission.htm (last visited July 8,
2007).
10. To name just a few: AFTER INNOCENCE (American Film Found. 2005), LIFE (Imagine Entm't
2000), THE HURRICANE (Azoff Entm't 1999), A MAP OF THE WORLD (Cinerenta Medienbeteiligungs
KG 1999), BROKEDOWN PALACE (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1999), SNOW FALLING ON
CEDARS (The Kennedy/Marshall Co. 1999), IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE (Odyssey Video 1996), IN-
DICTMENT: THE MCMARTIN TRIAL (Abby Mann Prods. 1995), IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER (Hell's
Kitchen Films 1993), PRESUMED INNOCENT (Mirage 1990), TRUE BELIEVER (Columbia Pictures Corp.
1989), AN INNOCENT MAN (Interscope Commc'ns 1989), A CRY IN THE DARK (Cannon Entm't 1988),
AMERICAN GIGOLO (Paramount Pictures 1980),... AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (Columbia Pictures Corp.
1979), THE WRONG MAN (Warner Bros. Pictures 1956), CALL NORTHSIDE 777 (Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp. 1948), THE Ox-Bow INCIDENT (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. 1943).
11. It was filmed in only nineteen days at a total cost of just $349,000. See BlinkBits, 12 Angry
Men Wikipedia RSS Feed, http://www.blinkbits.com/bits/viewtopic/I 2_angry-men-wikipediarssjfeed
?t=2616855 (last visited July 8, 2007) (citing SIDNEY LUMET, MAKING MOVIES (1995)).
12. Id.
13. By some admittedly very rough objective measures, 12 Angry Men has had little lasting im-
pact either in the public consciousness generally or in the halls of the legal academy. A recent (March
29, 2007) Google search of 12 Angry Men yielded 617,000 hits, compared to 639,000 for Bridge on the
River Kwai. An identical query in the text and periodicals database of Westlaw, restricted to the title
2007]
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As of March 29, 2007, 12 Angry Men was not among the top 100
movies rented from NetFlix. 14 Even in the NetFlix "classic" category, it is
a modest #21, right below The Sound of Music and seven spots below its
nemesis Kwai.15 It is true that it has enjoyed a rather consistently high
reputation among the filmerati, 16 but the notion that the movie is an impor-
tant cultural icon seems itself to be largely an echo of the myth of inno-
cence.
On the other hand, transcendent myths can be tricky things. Maybe the
best measure of their vitality is in their retelling. But alas, unlike what
seems to be every other movie made in the last fifty years, including
Kwai,17 12 Angry Men has never been remade on the big screen or been the
subject of a sequel or prequel. No Tom Hanks as the brooding Juror #8, or
Freddie Prinze, Jr., as the defendant. No sequel following the wrongfully
accused youngster on to college then law school, or the courageous holdout
into political office. No prequel showing the real perpetrator committing
the murder. 18
field, generated only four hits, compared to an astonishing three hits for Kwai. (Maybe not that aston-
ishing, because all three articles are about a reported federal case arising out of trademark litigation over
the distribution of an unauthorized sequel, Return from the River Kwai. See Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. v.
Unger, 14 F. Supp. 2d 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). In this sense, Kwai has had some direct impact on the law
that 12 Angry Men never has.) Expanding the Westlaw searches for the presence of the movie titles
anywhere in the text of the article generated 199 references to 12 Angry Men and 62 for Kwai. To give
some context to the way these searches might measure the cultural diaspora of a piece of fiction, the
same Westlaw text search yielded 1,110 hits for Alice in Wonderland. Now that's cultural resonance.
14. Netflix, Top 100, http://www.netflix.com/Topl00 (last visited March 29, 2007).
15. Netflix, Classics Top 25, http://www.netflix.com/Top25?sgid=306 (last visited March 29,
2007).
16. For example, in June 2003 the American Film Institute named Henry Fonda's character the
twenty-eighth greatest movie hero of the twentieth century, finishing behind such dubious winners as
James Bond, Dirty Harry, Indiana Jones and Bob Woodward/Carl Bernstein. See AFI's 100 Years...
100 Heroes & Villains (CBS television broadcast June 3, 2003). The list of fifty greatest heroes and
fifty greatest villains is available at AFI's 100 Years ... 100 Heroes & Villains,
http://www.afi.com/tvevents/100years/handv.aspx (last visited March 29, 2007). 12 Angry Men finished
an impressive fourteenth in the Internet Movie Database's top 250 movies as voted by its users. See
IMDb Top 250, http://www.imdb.com/chart/top (last visited March 29, 2007).
17. See supra note 13.
18. I do not count the mini-versions in shows like Veronica Mars and Monk, see Nancy S. Marder,
Introduction to The 50th Anniversary of 12 Angry Men, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 557, 574 (2007), since
they are neither full-blown remakes nor spoofs. It is not hard to imagine why Hollywood moguls might
not be jumping on the bandwagon for a remake or spin-off: is the Britney Spears generation really ready
for a movie that takes place almost entirely inside the four walls of one room, and not a bedroom at
that? Other media have been more willing. It was remade for television in 1997, with Jack Lemmon as
Juror #8. See BlinkBits, supra note 11. It was also adapted to the London stage in 1964, in a production
starring Leo Genn as Juror #8, and has undergone several theatrical adaptations since, the more modem
ones using actresses on the jury and retitling the work 12 Angry Jurors or even versions called 12 Angry
Women. Id. Don't ask how twelve women manage to navigate the gender bias prohibited by J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
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If parody is the second sincerest form of flattery, then I should men-
tion that there have been only three parodies of 12 Angry Men that I've
been able to discover: one in 1959 on the weekly BBC sitcom Hancock's
Half Hour;19 one in a 1994 episode of The Simpsons;20 and one in a 1998
episode of King of the Hill.
2 1
Even if 12 Angry Men itself has not become a transforming cultural
icon, its central message has: the criminal justice system nabs innocent
people just about as often (and maybe more often) as it nabs guilty ones,
and as a result, the primary, and very difficult, job of jurors is to determine
whether the accused is guilty as a factual matter. Of course, this notion was
hardly invented by Sidney Lumet. The myth of factual innocence has a
long and interesting pre-1957 history, both on and off the screen.
In this essay I examine the differences between factual and moral
guilt, the long history and benefits of the myth of factual innocence, and,
finally, the costs of the myth in our modem, plea-bargain-dominated era.
But first, some definitional and empirical clarifications.
19. Hancock's Half Hour: Twelve Angry Men (BBC television broadcast Oct. 16, 1959). In a
complete reversal from the movie, Hancock plays the foreman of the jury in an open-and-shut case in
which the defendant is unquestionably guilty. But he delays the guilty verdict because he is making
more from the daily jury fee (30 bob) than he can at work. So he pontificates throughout delibera-
tions-for example, at one point he chides, "Does Magna Carta mean nothing to you? Did she die in
vain? Brave Hungarian peasant girl who forced King John to sign the pledge at Runnymede and close
the boozers at half past ten?" Id. For highlights from this episode, see Hancock's Half Hour--"Twelve
Angry Men," http://www.phespirit.info/hancock/hancock_41 .htm (last visited July 8, 2007).
20. The Simpsons: The Boy Who Knew Too Much (Fox television broadcast May 5, 1994). 1 was
sure I'd seen almost every episode of The Simpsons, but this one did not come to mind. My thanks to
Naomi Mezey & Mark C. Niles for alerting me to it in their article Screening the Law: Ideology and
Law in Popular American Culture, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 91, 131-32 (2005). In this episode, Freddy
Quimby, the nephew of the Kennedy-esque mayor of Springfield, is charged with assaulting a waiter,
after a very public argument they were having over the correct pronunciation of the word "chowder."
(The waiter insists on a faux-French pronunciation--"show-dair"-while Freddy argues for the Boston
blue blood version-"chowdah."). The Boy Who Knew Too Much, supra. But no one witnessed the
assault other than a truant and hiding Bart. What actually happened was that the waiter slipped on a
Rice Krispies Square. Bart is silent because he knows if he admits he was there he'll get in trouble with
Principal Skinner. The holdout juror is Homer, who is hoping, A la Hancock, not for justice but for a
few more nights of free cable in the Springfield Palace Hotel, where the jury is sequestered. Homer,
unlike Henry Fonda, is unable to persuade his fellow jurors of the defendant's innocence, but justice is
nevertheless done when the judge allows Bart's untimely testimony, saying, "Even though reopening
the trial at this point is illegal and grossly unconstitutional, I just can't say no to kids." Id. I suppose this
makes the judge an "ordered liberty" kind of guy, rather than a textualist.
21. King of the Hill: Nine Pretty Darn Angry Men (Fox television broadcast Nov. 17, 1998). Hank
and eight others participate in a focus group about the Mason 5500 lawnmower. Originally, Hank is the
only one who prefers the old model, the Mason 1500. Hank eventually convinces seven of the others
that the 1500 is superior, with arguments such as the 5500's seat warmer will warm the beer between
the rider's legs. Only Hank's father, Cotton, remains a holdout for the 5500. Hank's dispute with Cotton
over the lawnmowers is a thinly disguised proxy for their feelings about Cotton "trading in" Hank's
mother for a newer model. Id. For a summary of the episode, see FOX Broadcasting Company: King of
the Hill, http://www.fox.com/kingofthehill/episodes/0308.htm (last visited July 8, 2007).
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I. Is FACTUAL INNOCENCE REALLY A MYTH?
It is important to frame this question with some precision. The "myth"
of factual innocence is, I contend, a myth about the frequency with which
innocent people are caught in the net of the criminal law, to be freed, if at
all, only by the determination and insight of conscientious jurors, highly
paid superstar lawyers, innocence project students, or, if all else fails, cou-
rageous governors. Of course, factually innocent people are wrongly ar-
rested and wrongly convicted, as many innocence projects have
demonstrated, and as humans have known since the dawn of time.
22 Sys-
temic error is an unavoidable consequence of underlying, and irreducible,
human error. But the important core of the myth of factual innocence holds
that wrongful conviction is a regular occurrence, that prisons are full of
innocent people, and in fact that graveyards are full of innocent capital
defendants wrongfully executed.
Sadly, the empirical literature on wrongful convictions is itself woe-
fully infected with the mythology of factual innocence. Part of the problem,
of course, is definitional. How does one determine factual innocence after
the system-whose whole purpose is supposed to be truth-finding-has
determined, whether by plea or trial, that a defendant is in fact guilty? This
is the mother of all confirmation bias problems.
23
Before the advent of DNA testing, there were only a few narrow cir-
cumstances in which we could confidently assess a defendant's factual
guilt by any method other than the trial itself. In the era before the corpus
delicti rule was vigorously enforced, "victims" of "murder" occasionally
resurfaced very much alive.2 4 Fingerprints and some other kinds of pre-
DNA forensic evidence discovered after trial could sometimes do the trick.
22. Even God sometimes has trouble distinguishing the guilty from the innocent, or at least caring
about the difference. He was just about to wipe out the entire population of Sodom when Abraham
managed to convince him that it would be wrong to have the innocent Sodomites perish with the guilty.
Genesis 18:23-32. For a fascinating narrative of examples of wrongful executions in England from
1640 through 1790, see Bruce P. Smith, The History of Wrongful Execution, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 1185
(2005).
23. There have even been a handful of studies where judges are asked after trials whether the jury
reached the right result. We almost always say that they did. See, e.g., C. RONALD HUFF, ARYE
RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC
POLICY 60 (1996) (concluding by this deeply flawed method that a surprisingly high 2% of all con-
victed defendants may be innocent).
24. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 22, at 1190-92 (discussing the case of the Gloucestershire wife,
son, and servant of one William Harrison, all hanged for his murder in 1660, and all exonerated post-
mortem when Mr. Harrison returned in 1661 from what he claimed had been his abduction by Turkish
slavers).
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Confessions by the "real" criminal could also prove convictions wrongful,
though, of course, there is that problem of false confessions.
25
But a shocking segment of the literature in this area is based on wholly
unreliable evidence, and even anecdote and conjecture, to label convicted
defendants "innocent." For example, one of the earliest, and most oft-cited,
works on wrongful convictions was a 1987 study done by Hugo Bedau and
Michael Radelet claiming that 23 of the 350 capital defendants whose cases
they examined (including Sacco and Vanzetti) were executed despite their
factual innocence. 26 Yet the method by which Bedau (a philosopher) and
Radelet (a sociologist) determined whether the executed defendants were
actually innocent was essentially to reconstruct from the trial record, and
contemporaneous newspaper reports,27 a quite one-sided narrative from
which some doubt about factual guilt might plausibly be argued.
Other scholars immediately criticized this methodology and chal-
lenged Bedau and Radelet to come up with a single case of a demonstrably
innocent person executed in America in the modem era.28 Bedau and
Radelet have not only been unable to do so, one of them has recently ad-
mitted that their label "innocent" was really just a way of saying there were
errors in the trial, that factual guilt seemed to them to be a "close call," and
25. An argument could be made that the second confession is more reliable than the first, because
it's typically made without any police pressure and under the cover of an already convicted defendant.
See Stephanos Bibas, The Right to Remain Silent Helps Only the Guilty, 88 IOWA L. REV. 421, 426-27
(2003) (arguing that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), has hurt the innocent by reducing con-
fessions by the guilty). But, of course, the circumstances of each individual case matter very much on
this issue, and it is not at all difficult to imagine reasons for a false second confession-for example, to
protect a family member rightly arrested or even convicted.
26. Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital
Cases, 40 STAN. L. REV. 21, 73 tbl.10 (1987).
27. Id. at 29.
28. See, e.g., Stephen J. Markman & Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the
Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988); see also FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 163-64 (2003). Judge Cassell has called the
idea that innocent people have been executed in America under the modern death penalty system an
"urban legend." Paul G. Cassell, We're Not Executing the Innocent, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2000, at
A14. Of course, there is the now infamous case of Roger K. Coleman, executed for raping and killing
his nineteen-year-old sister-in-law. Anti-death-penalty activists across the country put considerable
political pressure on Virginia Governor Mark Warner to order post-execution DNA tests-the first
governor ever to do so-in an effort to identify the modern era's first wrongfully executed person. See
Maria Glod & Michael D. Shear, DNA Tests Confirm Guilt of Executed Man, WASH. POST, Jan. 13,
2006, at Al. The tests confirmed Coleman's guilt. See id. Of course, it would be just as wrong to con-
clude from this one story that innocence project clients are almost all guilty and the students in those
projects all gullible do-gooders, as it would be to conclude that almost all innocence project clients are
innocent and their student representatives all modern day Henry Fondas. These high publicity stories
may catalyze issues and inject them into the public consciousness, but they cannot tell us anything more
than we already know: the systems-both trial and post-trial exoneration-are not perfect.
2007]
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that some of those close calls must surely, as a statistical matter, have in-
volved some factually innocent people.
29
It is also not unheard of for academics-or more often reporters or ac-
tivists misquoting academics-to conflate trial error rates with wrongful
conviction rates. Studies showing astonishingly high error rates in capital
trials 30 have very little to do with the question of the rate at which factually
innocent people are being convicted. It is a giant leap from an erroneous
trial ruling to reversible error, and another giant leap from reversible error
to factual innocence.
A similar categorical mistake was arguably made by former Illinois
Governor George Ryan in 1993, when he commuted all 167 pending death
sentences in Illinois, in part because the Northwestern Innocence Project
had identified thirteen innocent Illinois death row inmates. 3 1 Among the
prisoners whose death sentences were commuted were many whose factual
guilt was not at all in doubt.3 2 Why did those deserving to die get the bene-
fit of this kind of twentieth-century version of the Blackstone Ratio? 33 In-
deed, much of the empirical confusion about wrongful conviction rates has
been driven by histrionics over the death penalty. To a large and unfortu-
29. See Hugo Adam Bedau et al., Convicting the Innocent in Capital Cases: Criteria, Evidence,
and Inference, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 587, 590 (2004) ("Close calls, by themselves, do not provide evi-
dence sufficient to enable us to point to the innocence of a particular individual defendant who was
executed."). I sympathize with the so-far unsuccessful hunt for even a single wrongfully executed
person in the modem era, and even with the argument that such persons almost certainly exist, given the
most recent data from innocence projects. But even with a numerator other than zero, we still need a
denominator to estimate the rates of wrongful executions, and it is the rates that matter in assessing
imperfect systems. See infra text accompanying notes 34-38.
30. See, e.g., James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1995,
78 TEX. L. REV. 1839, 1850 (2000) (claiming overall capital trial error rate of 68%).
31. Gov. Ryan commuted 164 death sentences to life, and 3 to 40 years (consistent with the
sentences received by their co-defendants). See Abdon M. Pallasch et al., Gov. Ryan Empties Death
Row of All 167, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at 2A. The day before, he pardoned four death row
inmates whom he determined had been tortured into confessing. Id.
32. This included Jacqueline Williams, who wanted a baby so much that she and her confederates
broke into a pregnant woman's apartment, shot and stabbed her, cut her open and removed her fetus,
then killed her ten-year-old and eight-year-old children to eliminate them as witnesses. See James
Taranto, Best of the Web Today, http://www.opinionjoumal.com/best/?id=110002904 (last visited
March 29, 2007). Governor Ryan admitted not all of the 167 were innocent: "Hell, I know some of
those people are guilty. But you can't pick and choose. That's what drove us to mass commutations.
How many more cases of wrongful convictions have to occur before we can all agree that this system in
Illinois is broken?" Pallasch et al., supra note 31 (quoting Gov. Ryan). In his January 13, 2003, online
column for the Wall Street Journal, James Taranto called the mass commutations "an act of stunning
moral vanity." Taranto, supra.
33. One might also ask why Gov. Ryan merely commuted the death sentences of all Illinois death
row inmates instead of pardoning them, since he'd admitted only "some" of them were factually guilty.
That is, the "wrongful conviction" rationale is both too strong and too weak to justify Gov. Ryan's mass
commutations.
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nate extent, the debate about wrongful convictions in a capital context has
become a proxy for arguments in favor of and against the death penalty.
34
And then there is the biggest empirical problem of all-what I call the
problem of the missing denominator. Because the myth of innocence is a
myth if we have exaggerated the frequency of wrongful convictions, it does
us no good to wring our hands over the number of wrongful convictions if
we cannot associate that number with the number of rightful convictions.
We need a denominator. It is true that innocence projects across the country
have identified, through DNA, some 500 rape and homicide defendants
over the last two decades who were wrongfully convicted at trial. 35 But
over that period, more than forty million felony cases were filed.
36
The data emanating from innocence projects never, and perhaps for
ethical reasons could never, tell us how many clients had their guilt con-
firmed by DNA analysis. 37 Despite this lack of a denominator, most report-
ers and some scholars have jumped to the unsupportable conclusion that the
system is in chaos and that innocent defendants are being convicted at an
alarmingly high, even if never mentioned, rate.
38
Even when they mention a rate, these leaps of faith ignore the differ-
ence between pleading guilty and being found guilty after trial, and thus
34. Compare Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in DEBATING THE DEATH
PENALTY: SHOULD AMERICA HAVE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT? 183 (Hugo Adam Bedau & Paul G. Cassell
eds., 2004), with HELEN PREJEAN, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF
WRONGFUL EXECUTIONS (2005).
35. Even this number is just an educated guess, because innocence projects have sprouted at a rate
that has not kept up with their reporting. It does appear that in the seventeen-year period 1989-2003 a
total of 340 rape and homicide convicts were exonerated by innocence projects. Samuel R. Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the United States, 1989 through 2003, 95 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 523-24
(2005). 1 am therefore using a conservative (that is, high) extrapolated figure of 500 exonerations for
the twenty-year period 1986-2005.
36. In the mid-point year of that period, 1997, there were roughly two million felony filings in
state courts. NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 2003, at 38
(2003), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/d research/csp/2003-Files/2003_Criminal.pdf. Federal
criminal filings were comparatively negligible, amounting to only 60,000 in fiscal year 1997. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1997,
at 16 tbl.l.2, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cfjs9902.pdf. Thus, I use the figure of
two million felony cases per year, or forty million over the twenty-year period from 1986-2005.
37. See Ellen Yankiver Suni, Ethical Issues for Innocence Projects: An Initial Primer, 70 UMCK
L. REV. 921, 949 (2002) (discussing the problem of disclosing facts learned from a guilty innocent
project client).
38. See, e.g., Rodney Uphoff, Convicting the Innocent: Aberration or Systemic Problem?, 2006
WiS. L. REV. 739. Despite its ambitious title, this article makes no effort to approximate wrongful
conviction rates and, like virtually every other scholarly contribution to the myth of innocence, uses
single cases to prove what no serious person disputes: that the system is not perfect. In fact, the title of
this article itself reflects the confused thinking about this problem. Wrongful convictions can be, and I
suggest probably are, both systemic and exceedingly rare. See also Adam Liptak, Study Suspects Thou-
sands of False Convictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at Al5.
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assume with absolutely no basis that the error rates are the same for both.39
But even if we assume a high and unacceptable trial error rate-say 20%-
no serious scholar believes that two out of every ten defendants who plead
guilty are innocent.4
0
It is nevertheless possible, with some careful examination of charge
rates, trial rates, and data from innocence projects, coupled with some
modest assumptions and extrapolations, to estimate a lower and upper
bound of the wrongful conviction rate. On the upper bound side, we know
wrongful trial convictions are exceedingly rare, as a percentage of all
criminal cases, for no other reason than that criminal trials themselves are
exceedingly rare. The average federal plea bargaining rate is 96.3%.41 The
average state rate is 95%.42 That means that even if juries were only 80%
right (an assumption at which even the most radical of trial critics would
surely cringe), the overall wrongful conviction rate would still be only
around 1%, assuming all defendants who plead guilty are guilty.
Do innocent people plead guilty? Of course. Innocent people some-
times even preempt their false guilty pleas by falsely confessing, both with
and without overbearing interrogation. But, again, at what rates do factu-
ally innocent people confess or plead guilty? 43 Even if 1 out of 100 plead-
ing defendants is factually innocent, the upper bound for the overall
wrongful conviction rate would still be just 1.95%.44
39. See, e.g., Andrew E. Taslitz, Convicting the Guilty, Acquitting the Innocent: The ABA Takes a
Stand, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2005, at 18, 19 (concluding that even if the error rate is small, "tens of
thousands" of innocent people are in prison or otherwise under supervision). But this very much de-
pends on how small the wrongful conviction rate is. If it is only 0.0016%, see infra text accompanying
notes 43-48, and even if every wrongfully convicted defendant is in prison, then of the roughly two
million people in U.S. prisons today only thirty-two are innocent.
40. The only study of false guilty pleas that I am aware of was done in England in the early 1980s,
and it concluded that 2.2% of a sample 500 guilty pleas in the city of Birmingham appeared unjustified
based on independent reviews of the committal papers. See MICHAEL MCCONVILLE & JOHN BALDWIN,
COURTS, PROSECUTION, AND CONVICTION 66-67 (1981).
41. In 2003 (the latest year for which these statistics are available), 74,850 federal criminal cases
were filed (and not dismissed) and 72,110 of them were disposed of by guilty plea. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 423
tbl.5.22 [hereinafter BJS SOURCEBOOK], available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/.
42. BJS SOURCEBOOK, supra note 41, at 450 tbl.5.46.
43. The increasingly pervasive myth of false confessions is a kind of corollary to the myth of
innocence. But like the data on wrongful convictions, the data of false confessions has been exaggerated
beyond all statistical recognition. See Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the "Innocent": An Examination
of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 523
(1999) (concluding that in a recent study of false confessions a substantial fraction of defendants la-
beled "innocent" were in fact guilty, that the problem of false confessions does not appear to be perva-
sive, and that it is concentrated among the mentally retarded).
44. That is, the 1% of tried defendants wrongfully convicted, plus the wrongfully-pleading defen-
dants, whose percentages are calculated as 95% x 1/100 = 0.95%. 1 can't imagine the "innocent-but-
pleading" rate is anywhere near 1 out of 100, although I say this with great trepidation and humility.
There is no doubt that the plea bargain machinery puts tremendous pressure on criminal defendants-
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As for the lower bound, innocence project data allow us to do some
estimates. In the twenty years in which innocence projects have identified
roughly 500 people wrongfully convicted after trial, 45 there were roughly
two million trials. 46 Even assuming 25% of those two million trials resulted
in acquittals (and ignoring, as legal academics are wont to do, the problem
of wrongful acquittals), that would yield a wrongful trial conviction rate of
only 0.033%.4 7 Since, as mentioned above, only 5% of cases are tried, that
yields a lower bound for the overall error rate of the system at around
0.0016%.
4 8
Now, where between these two estimated bounds-Il.95% and
0.0016%-does the real wrongful conviction rate lie? No one knows, but
we do know wrongful convictions are not anywhere near the 50/50 kind of
proposition that infects the popular culture.
When I say that the myth of innocence infects the popular culture, I
may well be doing a disservice to the general public by attributing the myth
so completely and broadly to them. In fact, I suspect the average person has
a great deal of confidence in the reliability of the system in ordinary kinds
of cases for ordinary sorts of purposes. For example, I doubt a prospective
employer's first reaction to an applicant's disclosure of a prior felony con-
viction is to assume the conviction was wrongful and that the applicant was
factually innocent. And where have the mavens of wrongful conviction
been in the slew of corporate scandals that have spilled into the criminal
guilty and innocent alike-to plead guilty to avoid the risk of a much more drastic result. And, in fact,
the myth of innocence-which, to a charged defendant, makes the system look incapable of distinguish-
ing the guilty from the innocent-only increases the pressure for the innocent to plead guilty, as dis-
cussed in Part IV(D). The confluence of these forces could mean that innocent defendants plead guilty
at a higher rate, but there are other forces that reduce this likelihood. Political pressures on prosecutors
will limit how sweet their offers will be to very serious charges. Trial judges can reduce the risk by
refusing to accept waivers of the factual basis even when state versions of the Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure II allow waivers, and by refusing to take so-called Alford pleas. See North Carolina v.
Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37-38 (1970) (guilty plea by defendant who insists on his factual innocence, and
says he is pleading guilty to avoid the risk of wrongful conviction and execution, is not an "involun-
tary" plea).
45. Seesupra note 35.
46. I reach this conclusion by applying a 5% trial rate to the roughly forty million criminal cases
filed in that twenty-year period. See supra note 36.
47. An acquittal rate of 25% applied to a total of two million trials yields 1.5 million trial convic-
tions. If only 500 of those trial convictions were wrongful, that represents a wrongful conviction rate of
0.00033 (500 - 1,500,000).
48. It is a lower bound because we can safely assume that not all wrongfully convicted defendants
in this period have been identified (that is, the real numerator is likely higher). This number also as-
sumes all people who plead guilty are in fact guilty, and we know that's not true. See supra note 40 and
accompanying text.
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law? My guess is that not many ordinary people think Kenneth Lay was
railroaded by a deeply unreliable trial system.
49
In the end, the myth of innocence seems to be driven more by legal
academics, wrongful conviction advocates, and journalists than by the
available data. But as with all editorials dressed in the sheep's clothing of
fact, the myth of innocence at least threatens to become accepted liturgy,
and that acceptance could, paradoxically, do substantial damage to the reli-
ability of the criminal justice system.
Before addressing the costs and benefits of the myth, let me pause to
emphasize the difference between factual guilt and moral guilt. I do this
because in my judgment the most significant cost of the myth of innocence
is an overemphasis on factual guilt and a corresponding neglect of moral
guilt.
50
II. FACTUAL GUILT AND MORAL GUILT
When I use the phrase "factual guilt" I mean to describe the situation
in which a criminal defendant did in fact commit the act charged, whether
or not he had the required mental state. When I use the phrase "moral guilt"
I mean the conclusion the fact finder makes about the mental state of a
factually guilty defendant, as well as the broader, though related, question
of what punishment is just.
Mens rea, which is Latin for "guilty mind," has been part of our
criminal law from its English inceptions. 5 1 In fact, virtually every civiliza-
tion that has left a record on the subject-including the Babylonians, Jews,
Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans-recognized the idea that both the act and
intention must be judged by the law. 52 Indeed, the notion that punishable
49. 1 recognize the myth of innocence does not adhere as tightly to the rich and well-represented,
which of course is just part of the central racist and classist assumptions upon which the myth has
always been built. See infra text accompanying notes 84-86.
50. See infra Part IV(E).
51. It comes from the English legal precept "actus non facit reum nisi mens sit reat" (the act is not
guilty unless the mind is guilty), which dates from at least the time of Henry I in the early I 100s, and
which was likely based on the writings of St. Augustine. See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45
HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932); Paul Robinson, Mens Rea 3 (Univ. Penn. Law Sch., Working Paper
No. 35, 1999), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=upenn/wps.
52. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 243 & n.4 (1952) (citing 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 126 (1932)). It is true that this general rule had some strict liability exceptions,
such as the quite common ancient rule that a man was strictly liable for the acts of his slaves, and even a
strict liability view of homicide. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 470-73 (Lawyers' Literary Club 2d ed.
1959) (1895). But these exceptions did not displace the rule that even in ancient times-when access to
the workings of the mind was so limited, at least by modem standards-civilized people cared both
about the wrongdoer's acts and his intentions.
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crimes must be non-accidental appears to be a human universal. 53 Holmes
famously noted that even a dog knows the difference between being stum-
bled over and kicked.
54
And yet mens rea also seems to be one of a handful of legal precepts
that simply does not resonate with the general public. 55 True, the public's
reaction to the notion that a criminal's state of mind should have something
to do with his guilt has no doubt waxed and waned over time. 56 Many peo-
ple's current skepticism about mental state defenses (including the general
defense that the defendant did not have the required mental state) seems
grounded on a perfectly appropriate and healthy skepticism of psychiatry
and psychology. 57 But there also seems to be a deeper, and perhaps more
longstanding, belief that serious criminal acts should be punished regard-
less of the actor's state of mind, simply because we can never be sure of
what was in the actor's mind. Everyone understands that a Mafia hit and a
hunting accident should generate different responses from the criminal law,
but refinements beyond that seem troubling.
58
53. See Stephen Morse & Morris B. Hoffman, The Uneasy Entente Between Insanity and Mens
Rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona, J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming fall 2007) (manuscript at 7,
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1147&context-upenn/wps). But see Deb-
orah W. Denno, Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 610 & n.58
("Commentators generally agree that primitive English law, developed during the fifth century, was
basically grounded in strict liability.") (citing 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 470-73);
Guyora Binder, The Rhetoric of Motive and Intent, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15 (2002) (suggesting that
"the supposedly ancient concept of mens rea as evil motive is really a modem polemical construct").
This confusion about the historical pedigree of mens rea may have something to do with the fact that
the criminal law itself-in the modem sense of the state punishing free-riders-is relatively recent. See
Morse & Hoffman, supra, at 55-56. This confusion may also explain why the United States Supreme
Court has described principles of mens rea as being "essential" to the criminal law, Morissette, 342 U.S.
at 273-74, but has never held that they are so fundamental as to be required by substantive due process.
Compare Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 107 (suggesting
constitutional limits to the legislative abolition of mens rea) with Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Consti-
tution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1278-79 (1998) (calling the notion that
"individualized moral blameworthiness" is central to the criminal law a myth). The ambivalence of the
Court and commentators on this constitutional question is no doubt framed by the emergence of the
regulatory state and its increasing reliance on newly-created strict liability crimes.
54. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAw 3 (Dover Publ'ns 1991) (1881).
55. The others that come to mind are the doctrines of complicity (and its cousin felony murder)
and, in the civil arena, employment-at-will. The general public's uneasiness with these doctrines often
emerges in jury selection. In my experience, it is not at all uncommon for prospective jurors to express
disbelief that someone who did not pull the trigger could be guilty of murder, or that an employer can
fire employees for almost any (or no) reason (at least in states, like Colorado, that remain employment-
at-will states).
56. This vacillation seems to have corresponded roughly to a similar vacillation in the public's
acceptance of the insanity defense. John Hinckley's acquittal did much to drive recent skepticism about
insanity. See Morse & Hoffman, supra note 53, at 59-60.
57. See, e.g., id. at 63 (criticizing the "over-sciencing" of mens rea and insanity).
58. This skepticism about super-refinements of intentionality has been expressed by several
commentators who have argued that the four flavors of intentionality recognized by the Model Penal
Code-intentional, knowing, reckless, and negligent-in fact collapse into one another. See, e.g., Larry
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Indeed, human brains have likely been built by evolution to give their
owners a strong presumption that other humans' misbehaviors are inten-
tional and not accidental. It is not difficult to imagine that a strong neural
presumption of intentionality would have been highly adaptive. It is
unlikely that our ancestors would have survived to be our ancestors had
they not been equipped with powerful assumptions that the stranger coming
over the hill was equipped with the same capacity for intentionality (e.g.,
murder) as they were. 59
This leaves us with an impossible neural paradox. We have a deeply
embedded sense that we should not punish accidents the same as non-
accidents, yet an equally powerful sense that most human actions are inten-
tional and a corresponding skepticism about protestations by the wrongdoer
that the wrong was an accident. In fact, these questions have a normative
content incapable of scientific assessment. Despite all of neuroscience's
recent advancements, it still cannot discriminate, or indeed even define, the
differences between, for example, acting intentionally and acting know-
ingly. Some of us have argued not only that these categories are logically
indistinct, 60 but that they mask a normative continuum that really just boils
down to one question: how bad was this behavior? 61 Jurors, not brain scan-
ners, must answer that question.
In any event, this generalized resistance to the mens rea inquiry-at
least to any form of the inquiry more refined than accident versus non-
accident-may explain, in part, why so many people, including Sidney
Lumet, wrongly assume that the focus of criminal trials is on factual
Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931
(2000); Morris B. Hoffman, Booker, Pragmatism, and the Moral Jury, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 455,
473-74 (2005); see also Douglas N. Husak & Craig A. Callender, Wilful Ignorance, Knowledge, and
the "Equal Culpability" Thesis: A Study of the Deeper Significance of the Principle of Legality, 1994
Wis. L. REV. 29 (discussing the "problem" of willful ignorance and the unsatisfactory treatment of that
mental state by courts); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque Recklessness, 91 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY. 597, 597-60 (2001) (arguing that this culpable mental state does not fit into the current
framework of the Model Penal Code). The same skepticism about our ability to assess mental states has
driven five state legislatures to abolish the insanity defense altogether, and others to channel all mental
state evidence into the insanity issue and to forbid it as a negation of mens rea. It has also driven the
Supreme Court's deference to those legislative decisions. See infra note 62.
59. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Commentary, The Biological Roots of
Punishment, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 627 (2004). Of course, I do not mean to commit the naturalistic
fallacy by suggesting that the fact we may have an evolutionary predilection to assume intentionality
means that the law should reflect that predilection. But such a built-in prejudice would explain the
difficulties legislators, judges, and jurors have with mens rea. See generally Owen D. Jones, Time-
Shifted Rationality and the Law of Law's Leverage: Behavioral Economics Meets Behavioral Biology,
95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1141 (2001).
60. See supra note 58.
61. See Hoffman, supra note 58, at 474.
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guilt.62 At least in my experience, factual guilt is seldom a genuine trial
issue,63 and what most jurors end up struggling over is not "whodunit" but
rather "what was that guy thinking?"
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MYTH
Truth has always been an important human idea. The Egyptians,
Sumerians, and Hindus (as just a small cross-section) all worshipped deities
devoted to truth.64 Cicero's first division of moral goodness was "the
knowledge of truth." 65 The significance of the association between the
good and the true is that it simultaneously recognizes the human capacity to
lie and the categorical, or at least social, value of resisting the temptation to
do so in most circumstances.66
In ancient systems, the unity of God and ruler meant that "truth-
finding" wasn't any more complicated than a matter of accessing revealed
truth. The myth of innocence was not necessary, or even conceivable, in
62. Even the United States Supreme Court has at times exhibited some hostility toward mens rea,
driving it to the same sort of confusion between mens rea and excuse exhibited by jurors and legislators.
For example, despite acknowledging the common law and pre-common law pedigree of mens rea, the
Court has never found that mens rea is so fundamental as to be required by substantive due process. See
supra note 53. To be fair, this result probably has more to do with the Court's deference to states on
these issues of defining crimes than with its own hostility toward mens rea. See. e.g., Montana v. Egel-
hoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (upholding Montana statute prohibiting introduction of evidence of volun-
tary intoxication to negate mens rea); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1977) (upholding
New York statute shifting to defendant the burden of proving defense of "extreme emotional distur-
bance"); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-37 (1968) (upholding Texas public drunkenness law, even
as applied to chronic alcoholics who allegedly cannot "control" their behavior). Moreover, in Clark v.
Arizona. 126 S. Ct. 2709 (2006), the Court not only upheld Arizona's truncated insanity definition, see
id. at 2718-25, but also upheld the Arizona case-based rule channeling most mental health evidence
into insanity and away from mens rea, see id. at 2725-29, making it extremely difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to show already skeptical jurors that a sane but mentally disturbed defendant may nevertheless have
lacked the required mens rea because of his mental condition.
63. There are, of course, cases in which factual guilt is very much at issue, and even some catego-
ries of cases that seem more likely to raise questions about factual guilt, such as sex assaults on chil-
dren, where there is often no forensic evidence. But they are the exception and not the rule.
64. The Egyptian goddess of truth and justice was Maat, who represented "the order which rules
the world through balance." PATRICIA TURNER & CHARLES RUSSELL COULTER, DICTIONARY OF
ANCIENT DEITIES 298 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (2000). The Sumerian god of truth was Kittu, but,
interestingly, his job title did not include justice; that job was his brother's, Misharu. See James W.
Bell, Sumerian Gods, Demons & Immortals Whose Names Start with "K",
http://www.jameswbell.com/geog0050knames.html (last visited March 29, 2007). Addanari is the
Hindu goddess of truth, nature, and religion. TURNER & COULTER, supra, at 14. Shiva, among her many
other jobs, is also associated with truth. Id. at 427.
65. M. TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 18-19 (Walter Miller trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1961)
(1913).
66. There may be biological roots to our deepest notions of right and wrong, including our imper-
fect worship of the true, grounded in the fact that we evolved as highly social animals in relatively small
groups. See, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, The Neuroeconomic Path of the Law, in LAW AND THE BRAIN
(Semir Zeki & Oliver Goodenough eds., 2006); Edward 0. Wilson, The Biological Basis of Morality,
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1998, at 53.
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
these systems because God told us--directly or through his anointed
ruler-what was true and what was false, what was right and what was
wrong, and who was guilty and who was innocent.67 But as civilizations
became more complex and as the reach of absolute divine rule was diluted
by bureaucracy (and, in the West, by the Church), systems had to be devel-
oped as proxies for the unerring truth-detecting abilities of individual god-
kings. A certain lack of trust in the divine proxies was understandable, and
more forgivable than a lack of trust in the divine itself. Justice and truth-
finding became forever infected with the imperfections of man.
Thus, for example, even the Babylonians, for whom the concepts of
law and justice played such an early and central role, and who identified
justice with two different gods, Marduk and Shamash, developed a court
system in which cases were heard by up to four judges, whose verdicts
were reviewable by the king.68 The Babylonians recognized that justice
systems administered by non-divine but divinely-appointed judges might
be infected with human error correctible only by the divine king himself.69
Another complication is that as the gods began to take on more and
more characteristics of man-the gods of the Greeks fighting and lying and
philandering and otherwise acting thoroughly human-gods needed their
own dispute resolution system, and mythical justice began to be adminis-
tered in two discrete systems, one for gods and one for men. Thus, the
Greek goddess Dike was the goddess of human justice, but her mother
Themis was the goddess of divine justice.70
But "justice" has always been much broader than mere "truth-
finding." Indeed, the image of justice with the balanced scales-probably
first represented by Greek depictions of Dike and Themis, and later copied
by the Roman goddess Justicia-may well have been meant to reflect the
67. Although as already mentioned, in one of the Old Testament's quintessentially anthropomor-
phic visions of God, even He occasionally gets confused between guilt and innocence. See supra note
22.
68. MSN Encarta Encyclopedia, Babylonia, http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia-761571780-
2 8/Babylonia.html#s8 (last visited March 29, 2007); Gateways to Babylon, Marduk,
http://www.gatewaystobabylon.com/gods/lords/mardukl .html (last visited March 29, 2007).
69. This notion of justice by divine intervention seems to be a human universal, often expressed in
the form of trial by battle or ordeal, discussed in the text accompanying notes 71-77. Where, you might
ask, were the interventionist powers of Marduk (or Apollo) to prevent the errors in the first place? The
answer, in part, is probably grounded in the nature of polytheistic systems, in which individual gods had
limited, and competing, powers. Marduk and Apollo may have been divine, but their ability to prevent
injustice in the human world was compromised by the meddling influences of dozens of other powerful
gods, who cared about things other than justice.
70. In some ways this distinction may have mimicked the distinction ancients made between
public and private wrongs.
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balanced and proportionate approach to punishment, not the weighing of
evidence of factual guilt, as in the modem symbolism.
Still, the ancients were well aware of the fallibility of man, and indeed
even of the increasing fallibility of their anthropomorphic gods. As forms
of democracy and republican government erupted onto the human stage
and replaced infallible kings, even if temporarily, ancient systems begin to
worry about factual guilt along with the divine challenge of just punish-
ment. Thus, classical and post-classical trial systems were very much inter-
ested in the problem of wrongful conviction. By the time of the always
practical Romans, trial systems were being designed as much for truth-
finding as punishment, which was still left largely to the Senate or emperor,
or their magisterial representatives. 7 1
But all this began to change with the ascendancy of the Church. All-
knowing god-kings, with their potentially fallible human agents, and classi-
cal trial systems designed to check fallible but powerful rulers, began to be
replaced with a single all-knowing God, just interventionist enough to take
worries about factual innocence back off the table. Thus, medieval truth-
finding systems, both on the continent and in England, were once again
based on revealed truth, in the form of reconstituted theological versions of
the ancient rights of trial by battle and trial by ordeal. 72 The guilty man lost
the trial by battle because God intervened to cause him to lose. The guilty
were burned in the ordeal of hot iron because God intervened to cause that
just result.
The jury, though long in existence in Europe, and likely imported to
England during the Conquest, was nevertheless exceedingly rare from the
time of Charlemagne through the mid-1200s. 73 For most serious crimes,
71. Indeed, most ancient, classical, and even medieval juries were presentment juries, that is, they
typically acted as modem-day grand juries, screening cases for probable cause before the ultimate guilt
or innocence, and punishment, was determined later by other methods. WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF
TRIAL BY JURY 106 (2d ed. 1971). It took the English presentment jury several centuries to evolve first
from mere presentment, then to a mixed system of presentment and trial before a subset of the present-
ment jurors, then to a completely separate system of non-overlapping presentment and trial juries. Id. at
125-38.
72. Trial by battle and trial by ordeal both have rich pre-medieval histories, reaching back as far as
recorded civilizations. There is evidence that the Israelites, pre-Roman era Germanic tribes, and Swed-
ish Goths all practiced a form of trial by battle, which then spread to Europe through the Vikings.
EDWARD J. WHITE, LEGAL ANTIQUITIES: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS UPON ANCIENT LAWS AND
CUSTOMS 109-12 & n.10 (1913). Various forms of the ordeal are just as old, appearing to have been
practiced by the Egyptians (from the time of Ahmase II), ancient Greeks, Israelites, and even Hindus.
Id. at 141-43 & n.4.
73. See THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200-1800, at 11 (1985); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC
WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW: BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 37-40 (2d ed.
1898). Some legal historians have even argued that the jury trial began as a procedural antecedent of the
ordeal, with the role of proto-jurors limited to deciding which ordeal a given defendant should face. See,
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trial by ordeal and, to a lesser extent, trial by battle, remained the Crown's
and Church's trial method of choice.
The worm of revealed truth began to turn yet again in the early part of
the thirteenth century, as a result of increasing theological skepticism about
God's interest in the everyday activities of man,74 as well as a few promi-
nent scandals in which priests performing these truth-finding rituals had
been bribed by the winning side. 75 The ordeal was banned by the Church in
1215.76 And although trial by battle remained on the books in England until
1819, it fell out of favor in the thirteenth century and all but disappeared by
the end of Edward III's reign. 77 Largely by default, trial by jury became the
English truth-finding mechanism for serious crimes.
In England, the idea that the state might wrongfully accuse an individ-
ual of committing a crime ascended at roughly the same time as the divine
perfection of kings descended, and nobles became not the enforcers of the
King's law but its principal political targets.78 The problem was simple:
people lacked confidence in the divine truth-finding abilities of kings, yet
kings retained the same powers of accusation as they did in the days their
powers were thought divine. The criminal law became an important tool in
the King's struggle for retaining that power, and prominent anti-royalist
e.g., THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 120 (Little, Brown &
Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929).
74. As one English legal historian has put it, "The clergy had never given an unqualified assent to
the ordeal; they had been the means of its gradual disuse, as they deemed it an impious reference to
Heaven." JOHN PROFFATT, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACT
§ 28, at 41-42 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1986) (1877).
75. One prominent priest admitted that he had felt a moral duty to assist in achieving the "right"
result. PLUCKNETT, supra note 73, at 114-15.
76. This ban was part of Pope Innocent IIl's Fourth Lateran Council. Id. at 118-19.
77. LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY: TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 123 (2d ed. 1988);
WHITE, supra note 72, at 118; Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the Decline of Private Prosecution in
Thirteenth-Century England, 19 LAW & HIST. REV. 1 (2001).
78. Many of the most significant English criminal law reforms can be traced to Parliament's own
fear of prosecution. These reforms included Parliament's abolition of the Crown's unlimited peremp-
tory challenges in 1305, An Ordinance for Inquests, 1305, 33 Edw., Stat. 4 (Eng.); limitations on the
King's right to pardon homicides imposed in 1389, Other Statutes Made at Westminster, 1389, 13 Rich.
2, c. 1 (Eng.); the first right to counsel (in treason cases only) in 1695, An Act for Regulateing of Tryals
in Cases of Treason and Misprision of Treason, 1695, 7 & 8 Will. 3, c. 3 (Eng.); and its repeal of the
ban of "full defense" (i.e. allowing defense counsel to address the jury) in felony cases in 1836, An Act
for Enabling Persons Indicted of Felony to Make Their Defence by Counsel or Attorney, 6 & 7 Will. 4,
c. 114 (1836). Some scholars have argued more generally that in both England and America legislators
have been willing to implement the most significant protections in criminal law and procedure at times
when they believed themselves most at risk of criminal prosecution. See Craig S. Lemer, Legislators as
the "American Criminal Class ": Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004
U. ILL. L. REv. 599.
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members of Parliament were occasionally accused on trumped-up charges
and executed.
79
It was this fear-of political repression through unjust criminal prose-
cution-that caused a kind of neo-classical rediscovery in England of the
problem of factual innocence. The idea that the criminal law could be, and
was, used as an unjust tool of political repression was a significant and
resonating narrative of the Enlightenment-a narrative that had important
repercussions in the American colonies. American skepticism, even hatred,
of the English criminal justice system was a central part of the pre-
revolutionary experience. The new nation's preoccupation with factual
guilt coincided exactly with its collective suspicion of our English ances-
tors' woeful, or at least suspicious, ability to detect the truth in politically
charged cases.
Yet even as the jury trial emerged in England and America as the pre-
eminent, and humanly flawed, form of truth-detection, it would be a mis-
take to believe that over the broad swathe of its history it was concerned
primarily with factual guilt. It was not. It was much more concerned with
the punitive aspects of moral guilt, that is, with the punishment that a just
and merciful king or society should impose on the factually guilty. After
all, apart from political prosecutions, English life went on, and ordinary
criminals needed to be detected and prosecuted. And the overall confidence
in the reliability of these tasks remained high.
In fact, throughout the police-less seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries, ordinary criminal cases in England were frequently initiated and, in
the modern parlance, "put together," by victims or witnesses themselves,
with any additional rudimentary investigation done by the magistrates at
what we would call the preliminary hearing. 80 Even after the creation of
professional police in London in the late 1800s, magistrates retained the
power to summarily convict or acquit in misdemeanor cases, and it seems
the vast bulk of prosecutions not only terminated at the magistrate level,
but frequently enjoyed a legislative exemption from the ordinary presump-
tion of innocence. 81 Parliament might have had serious worries about the
79. Perhaps the most famous examples were the political trials of the 1680s conducted by Judges
Jeffreys and Scroggs, and the treason trials of the later Stuarts. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS
OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 67-79 (2003).
80. See CYNTHIA B. HERRUP, THE COMMON PEACE: PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 68 (1987); PETER KING, CRIME, JUSTICE AND DISCRETION IN
ENGLAND: 1740-1820, at 17 (2000); see also John Styles, Sir John Fielding and the Problem of Crimi-
nal Investigation in Eighteenth-Century England, 33 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL HIST. SOC'Y 127
(5th series 1983).
81. See Bruce P. Smith, The Presumption of Guilt and the English Law of Theft, 1750-1850, 23
LAW& HIST. REV. 133 (2005).
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truth-finding abilities of political prosecutions against its own members,
but the establishment of guilt in ordinary criminal cases was largely a mat-
ter of routine, either at the magistrate or judge level, often bolstered by the
statutory presumption of guilt.
Indeed, even in ordinary cases that managed to reach the Crown
Courts, the most important function of English jurors, as early as the 1300s,
was not to assess factual guilt, which was still pretty much a given, but
rather to act as a buffer between the guilty and what came to be viewed by
ordinary citizens as grossly excessive levels of punishment. Thomas Green
describes mid-fourteenth century English jury verdicts as "judgments about
who ought to live and who ought to die, not merely determinations regard-
ing who did what to whom and with what intent."182 Blackstone's famous
phrase "pious perjury" describes the not uncommon nullification by seven-
teenth century juries in cases where they believed death was unwarranted
even for a factually guilty defendant. 83 Even as late as the eighteenth cen-
tury, English jury trials were in fact "sentencing proceedings," whose
whole function was to persuade the jury to convict the factually guilty de-
fendant of a lesser non-capital offense.
84
How could it be that factual guilt was so taken for granted even after
trials were no longer a matter of revealed truth? The answer may have
something to do with the oath. God-fearing people took the oath seriously.
A truth-finding system that gives witnesses, including the accused, the
choice between telling the truth and suffering eternal damnation can have a
high level of confidence in its accuracy, and needs no myth of factual inno-
cence. 85 As our Anglo-American faith began to wane, so too did our confi-
dence in the oath, and therefore our confidence in the truth-finding abilities
82. GREEN, supra note 73, at 98.
83. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *238-39.
84. John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 41 (1983); see also J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN
ENGLAND: 1660-1800, at 419-30 (1986).
85. In fact, a high confidence in the oath was reflected in a third kind of medieval trial system--
trial by compurgation, sometimes also called "the wager of law." In criminal trials by compurgation, the
accused, after taking his oath of innocence, was required to call a designated number of compurgators,
or "oath-helpers." The required number and rank of the compurgators varied according to the serious-
ness of the charge. If the required quantity and quality of compurgators appeared and vouched by their
own oaths for the defendant's oath of innocence, the defendant was declared innocent without any
further messy inquiry into the actual facts. See generally ROBERT VON MOSCHZISKER, TRIAL BY JURY
§§ 43-48, at 34-38 (1922). See also Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspec-
tive: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625 (1996) (analyzing the impact of our modem
failure to recognize the importance of the oath on the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of
"compell[ing]" a witness to testify).
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of any of our systems. 86 It is that loss of confidence in the oath that may
have become the kernel at the core of the modern myth of factual inno-
cence.
There is almost no data about colonial and early post-colonial Ameri-
can juries, and almost no innocence liturgy from this period. There is no
doubt that slavery-the great festering constitutional issue-left in its wake
a profound skepticism about southern governments' ability, and indeed
even their intent, to treat the newly freed slaves justly in any manner of
things, including the criminal justice system. Thus, most of the earliest
American innocence literature is associated with abolitionist and post-
abolitionist views of racial injustice, slavery itself being a kind of arche-
typical wrongful conviction. 87 From Reconstruction and Jim Crow forward,
there has been a strong and no doubt entirely earned (though largely retro-
spective) presumption of wrongful conviction whenever all white police-
men arrested, and all white juries convicted, black defendants. 88 This only
reinforced our already libertarian skepticism from the Revolutionary pe-
riod.
The result is an American race-based strain of the myth of innocence
that is so robust it has been virtually impervious to the winds of changing
politics. From Huckleberry Finn to the Ox-Bow Incident, through and be-
yond World War II, there has been a powerful American narrative about
the shabby way the criminal justice system mistreats the disenfranchised
and powerless.
This political strain of the myth has somehow metastasized into an
overall lack of confidence in the system's truth-detection abilities, quite
apart from the race or ethnicity of its targets. Indeed, in the allegedly bu-
colic and innocent post-WWII period-when confidence in government
was arguably at an all time high-Erle Stanley Gardner's Perry Mason was
a staple of pop literature, then radio and television. 89 And in the Perry Ma-
86. For example, concerns in the mid-1700s about wrongful convictions at the Old Bailey led to
several evidentiary reforms, including rules relating to confessions and corroboration, and allowing a
defendant to be represented by a lawyer. Smith, supra note 22, at 1198.
87. Not all of the earliest innocence narratives were race-based. For example, there was a notori-
ous case of the wrongful conviction and near-execution (the supposed murder victim showed up at the
hanging) of two free, white Vermont men in 1819. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN
AMERICAN HISTORY 121-22 (2002).
88. Still, I know of no reliable data on the rates at which innocent black defendants were rail-
roaded by the criminal law, both North and South, in the last half of the nineteenth century. The appall-
ing image of perfectly innocent black men being lynched without trials is so repugnant that it has
drowned out a very different question: what effect did the racism of that period have, and might still be
having, on wrongful conviction rates?
89. Gardner published the first of what would be eighty-two Perry Mason novels in 1933. Warner
Brothers actually produced six feature Perry Mason films in the mid- to late-I 930s, but the stories did
not reach mass appeal until a CBS afternoon radio show that ran from 1944 to 1955. Perry Mason had
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son stories the police and prosecutors suffered a 100% error rate-the
charged person (always white and often well-to-do) was never guilty, and
was saved not by Henry Fonda or innocence project students but by Ray-
mond Burr.90
And then there is O.J. Simpson. In a delicious inversion of the inno-
cence narrative, this time the black defendant is, from all indications, actu-
ally guilty, 91 and the system still can't get it right.
What I call in this essay the "myth of factual innocence" is in some
sense a distorted version of the presumption of innocence. 92 It is one thing
to presume the innocence of an untried defendant, and quite another to
presume it of an already convicted one. Of course, the myth of innocence
reinforces the presumption of innocence. It is in the trial process itself-
where individual jurors are called upon to assess both the factual and moral
guilt of an individual defendant-that the myth has its most palliative
value. We want jurors to believe the arrest and prosecution systems are so
completely unreliable that virtually everyone is factually innocent, in order
to reinforce the presumption that the particular defendant before them is
innocent. We want all jurors to be Henry Fondas, and we want all jurors to
believe there will be a terrible miscarriage of justice if they are not Henry
Fondas. But at what cost?
IV. COSTS OF THE MYTH
A. Loss of Confidence
The most obvious cost of the myth of factual innocence is the general
public's loss of confidence in the criminal justice system, both in policing
and in adjudication. More than fifty years of being told by the fourth estate
that innocent people are regularly arrested, and only slightly less regularly
three runs on television, all starring Raymond Burr as the world's winningest criminal defense lawyer:
once as a weekly series from 1957 to 1966; then in one season as a series in 1973; and finally as inter-
mittent made-for-television movies that ran from 1985 through Burr's death in 1993.
90. Television took back the mantle of innocence in 1963 in The Fugitive series, which ran
through the 1967 season.
91. Although acquitted in the criminal case, Simpson was found in the civil case to have caused
the deaths of Nicole Brown and Ronald Goldman. Rufo v. Simpson, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 492, 497 (Ct.
App. 2001).
92. The presumption of innocence-at least the obligation of the state to prove a defendant's guilt,
if not necessarily beyond a reasonable doubt-seems to be as deeply embedded in the history of civili-
zation as the ideas of truth and falsity, and human fallibility. It traces its roots through Deuteronomy,
Sparta, Athens, Trajan's Rome, and the earliest English common law. For a discussion of the history of
the presumption of innocence, see Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454-56 (1895). But see supra
note 81 and accompanying text (discussing the English statutory presumption of misdemeanor guilt
frequently operating at the magistrate level).
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convicted, has had its effects. The presumption of innocence, at least in the
general public's mind, has become almost irrebuttable. With so many inno-
cent folks caught up in the web of such an unreliable system, guilty ver-
dicts themselves are at risk of losing their reliability, and convictions their
opprobrium.
This skepticism about the system is palpable in jury selection. In my
experience, it is not uncommon for prospective jurors-especially those
who have never actually served on a jury-to express the belief that the
trial is some kind of battle of lawyers largely unrelated to truth, that the
best lawyers usually win, and therefore that poor people who can't afford
the best lawyers tend to be wrongfully convicted. 93 This loss of confidence
is also quite regularly expressed by prospective jurors in a form some
commentators have dubbed "the CSI bias," in which prospective jurors
indicate their confidence in the system is so low that they could not convict
anyone without irrefutable forensic evidence.
94
Having said that, I must also say that I do not believe these views are
having significant impacts on verdicts, at least in my jurisdiction, both
because jurors with the most extreme forms of these views are being ex-
cused for cause or peremptorily, and because jurors in large part can put
their prejudices aside, actually pay attention to the evidence and follow the
instructions, and do the right thing in the case at hand despite grand views
about the system as a whole.95 Nevertheless, the loss in confidence is hurt-
ing the system in the following less direct ways.
B. Undervaluing Public Defenders/Overvaluing Lawyering
The myth of factual innocence condemns defense lawyers to the same
rubbish bin of incompetence as jurors. All these innocent people are in
prison because their defense lawyers were not Perry Mason. If you are rich
enough to hire Perry Mason, you get off, sometimes even if you are guilty.
93. Just this year I was astonished by a prospective juror in a criminal case who told us in cham-
bers that he could not be fair because he had heard that the lowest ranking law students are the ones that
go on to become district attorneys, and that such under-qualified lawyers must surely be prosecuting
lots of innocent people, especially ones who can't afford "real lawyers."
94. These views are probably just fallout from the popular television shows that oversell the state
of forensic science. Even so, an exaggerated reliance on forensics plays into an exaggerated view of
factual innocence. For a thought-provoking criticism of claims that the "CSI effect" is real, see Tom R.
Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115
YALE L.J. 1050 (2006).
95. See John L. Kane, Reasonable Doubt and Other Shibboleths, LITIG., Fall 2002, at 22. More-
over, as I've mentioned above, in their everyday lives and for ordinary (that is, non-trial) purposes,
people seem to continue to have a high confidence in the reliability of the system. See supra text ac-
companying notes 48-49.
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But if you are so poor you must rely on public defenders instead of "real
lawyers," your chances of being rightly acquitted are next to zero.
Despite the innocence project anecdotes about sleeping, drunk, and
otherwise incompetent defense lawyers, this picture of rampant defense
incompetence couldn't be further from the truth, at least in my experience.
I have told friends, and even written,96 that if they get into serious criminal
trouble in Denver, the first thing they should do is give away their assets in
order to qualify for a public defender. Yes, public defenders are overbur-
dened and underpaid, but on the whole they are also the finest single col-
lection of criminal defense lawyers around, and for good reason-
experience. I would stack the best of our public defenders against any pri-
vate defense lawyer I know.
97
Somewhat paradoxically, the low esteem into which the myth of inno-
cence casts public defenders simultaneously overvalues lawyering itself,
not unlike how it overvalues forensics. Contrary to public perception, the
best facts win, not the best lawyers. Trials are contests of facts, not contests
of lawyers. Some of the best lawyering I have ever seen has resulted in
spectacular losses, some of the worst in spectacular wins. It's the evidence
that's important to outcome, not the oratorical or sartorial abilities of the
messengers.98
The view that the best lawyers win and the worst lawyers lose, that
public defenders are bad and highly paid private defense lawyers are good,
not only does terrible damage to the public's already waning confidence in
the system, it has the pernicious effect of reinforcing all the worst stereo-
types of the system as being hopelessly racist and classist. Not only do
innocent people get wrongly convicted, so this stereotype goes, it is the
poor and disenfranchised-those who cannot afford Perry Mason-who are
getting disproportionately wrongfully convicted. Conversely, rich white
96. Morris B. Hoffman, Op-Ed, Free-Market Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2007, at A19.
97. Here's where I must admit my own popular and scholarly contributions to the myth of public
defender incompetence. Along with two economist co-authors, in 2005 1 published an econometric
study of public defender effectiveness rates as compared to those of private counsel. Morris B. Hoffman
et al., An Empirical Study of Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the "'Marginally Indi-
gent," 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 223 (2005). Our data showed that public defenders were less effective
than private lawyers, but a closer reading of that data suggested a reason having nothing to do with
abilities: public defender clients tend to be self-selected for guilt. I reprised this analysis in an opinion
piece published in the New York Times. See Hoffman, supra note 96.
98. Granted a certain minimum level of competence is necessary. But here again the myth has
mixed up incidents with incidence. Sure, there are terrible miscarriages of justice because defense
counsel are too incompetent to defend defensible cases (and, of course, miscarriages of justice in the
other direction when incompetent prosecutors are too incompetent to prove provable cases). But at what
rates?
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men who are guilty are regularly getting off because of their highly paid
lawyers.
People who believe this may watch lots of movies and TV, but they
are not spending much time in our courtrooms. As these mistaken beliefs
percolate through the culture and through the population of prospective
jurors, they make it only more difficult to find jurors who will be able to
decide the case on the merits. The myths of innocence, trial gamesmanship,
and unequal treatment become self-fulfilling.
C. Undervaluing Jurors
While the myth of innocence overvalues lawyering, it undervalues ju-
roring, and for precisely the same reasons. It is because jurors are such
dunderheads, in whose midst we can hardly expect a Henry Fonda once a
year let alone every day, that they get bamboozled by slick and corrupt
prosecutors (when they wrongfully convict) or by slick and greedy big
name defense lawyers (when they wrongfully acquit), or so this stereotype
goes. This kind of caricature of jurors is as far from the truth as the carica-
ture of lawyers.
In my experience, jurors almost always take their jobs, and oaths, very
seriously. It is not at all uncommon for them to express, in our post-verdict
debriefings, that their emotions told them one thing but that the facts and
law required them to do the other, in either direction. In many cases in
which they have returned not guilty verdicts, jurors tell me afterwards that
they thought the defendant was probably guilty, but that the prosecution
simply did not prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Conversely, I
have had many jurors, especially in homicide cases, dissolve into tears
because they knew the consequences of their guilty verdict but were com-
pelled by the evidence and the instructions to render it anyway.
The myth of innocence contributes to a terribly impoverished view of
jurors as either complete idiots or secret racists, incapable in either event of
evaluating evidence fairly and honoring their oaths to decide the case based
on that evidence and based on laws with which they might not even agree.
Again, as with the other aspects of the myth, as this impoverished view
becomes accepted truth in the community of prospective jurors, it threatens
to self-fulfill.
D. Increasing the Rate of Wrongful Pleas
One of the worst effects of the myth of innocence is that its wide-
spread acceptance among the public will itself increase the chances that
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innocent defendants might plead guilty. After all, if an innocent person is
wrongfully accused of a serious crime, and believes the criminal trial sys-
tem is so unreliable that he has a good chance of being wrongfully con-
victed of the charged offense despite his innocence, he will be under
tremendous pressure to plead guilty to a less serious charge even though he
is innocent. And of course because the system is 95% about guilty pleas
and only 5% about trials, even a slight increase in the rate of wrongful
pleas, unlike a slight increase in the rate of wrongful trial convictions, will
have a tremendous impact on the overall numbers of wrongful convictions.
E. Neglecting Moral Guilt
I've saved for last what I believe to be the most profound and damag-
ing cost of the myth of factual innocence: by overemphasizing factual guilt
the system neglects moral guilt. This is the central failing of narratives like
12 Angry Men.
Prospective jurors are unprepared for the arduous task of assessing a
defendant's intentionality in part because they so regularly come into our
courtrooms assuming trials are only about factual guilt. It is not uncommon
in my experience to have jurors let out audible gasps when I move from the
instructions dealing with the charges to the ones dealing with the lesser-
included offenses based on less culpable mental states. I can imagine what
they are thinking: "What? I spent the last week thinking my job was to
decide whether the prosecution proved the defendant pulled the trigger.
And now, after all the evidence has been presented, and it is clear to every-
one (despite the fact that so many innocent people get convicted) that this
defendant is not innocent and that he did in fact pull the trigger, it turns out
you, judge, have changed everything around and are now asking us to de-
cide what was inside defendant's head at the time he pulled the trigger?"
Granted, in most cases the lawyers will have alerted the jurors to the
question of intentionality in their openings, examinations, and closings.
This problem can also be blunted by giving some of the elemental and cul-
pability instructions early on. Still, these citizens have spent their adult
lives being told that that the system is in shambles, that innocent people are
regularly falsely accused and falsely convicted, and therefore that their trial
energies will be consumed, as were Henry Fonda's and his colleagues', in
the difficult task of ferreting out the innocence lurking behind the insur-
mountable evidence of guilt.
This perception not only predisposes our jurors to speculate, as did
Henry Fonda and his colleagues, about unreasonable alternative factual
explanations, and to substitute an any-doubt test for a reasonable doubt
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test,9 9 it also has the potential to prejudice defendants who have defensible
cases based on lack of the required mens rea. When the myth is so exclu-
sively focused on factual guilt, and when the myth is overcome by over-
whelming evidence, jurors will have little patience with a factually guilty
defendant's contention that he is morally and legally innocent because of
what was inside his head at the time of the crime. That is, the myth of inno-
cence reinforces what is already, as discussed above, a widespread skepti-
cism about mental defenses.l00
CONCLUSION
12 Angry Men was a good movie, and everyone interested in the jury
system should see it. But it buttresses a long and unfortunate tradition of
grossly overestimating the frequency at which factually innocent people are
caught up in the criminal justice system.
Yes, we want jurors to force prosecutors to prove both the act and the
intention beyond a reasonable doubt. We also should care very much about
factually innocent defendants who are wrongfully convicted despite these
presumptions and all the other protective mechanisms in place. But by con-
flating the pre-trial presumption of innocence with a wholly unsupported
post-trial presumption that the criminal justice system is highly unreliable,
we threaten to turn the myth into reality, especially in our plea-bargain
dominated era. And by sending the message to prospective jurors that trials
are typically about factually innocent people wrongly accused, we also risk
them overlooking the factually guilty but morally innocent, that is, the de-
fendant who committed the act but without the required intention.
So what's a culture to do? To begin with, legal scholars could start a
more comprehensive and serious hunt for a meaningful wrongful convic-
tion denominator, instead of continuing to swoon about the numerator. 10 1 It
also wouldn't hurt if they paid some attention to the problem of wrongful
acquittals.
Journalists could help by trying to inject some perspective, let alone
any critical analysis, into their stories on innocence projects and other con-
99. See supra note 4.
100. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
101. The only serious effort to do so that I am aware of has been by D. Michael Risinger, Convict-
ing the Innocent: An Empirically Justified Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=931454. Professor Risinger estimates a lower
bound of 3.3% for wrongful trial convictions. Id. at 15. Given the 95% plea bargaining rate, we must
multiply that 3.3% estimate by 5% in order to estimate the overall wrongful conviction rate. That yields
0.165%, a number within the range I propose in this essay (1.95% to 0.0016%), and still a far cry from
the histrionics of innocence advocates.
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tributions to the mythology of innocence. Having regular crime/court beat
writers do these stories, rather than feature or editorial writers, might be
one good way to inject perspective.
Trial lawyers and judges can help by making clear early on that a
crime consists of both an act and an intention, and by being vigilant in ex-
cusing prospective jurors whose focus on the act threatens to blind them to
the intention, or whose deeply flawed views about the rate of wrongful
convictions threatens to turn them into Henry Fondas hunting for unreason-
able doubt.
But I'm not too sanguine. Culture, especially legal-academic culture,
is an awfully big battleship to turn. Besides, "Innocent Man Convicted" just
sells more movie tickets and newspapers, and gets more attention from
student-editors of law reviews, than "Guilty Man Convicted" or even
"Guilty Man Acquitted."
